FIG. 1

12, collectors

Network, 18

12, collectors

10

14

Aggregator, 14

200a

200b

200, grouping process

Operator console 16

20, nodes

FIG. 2

22

Non-TCP

Determine
protocol, 23a

TCP

Synch packet is the client
Synch_ack packet is the server

Well-known port,
23c?

list

yes

Identify source that
sent synch_ack, 23d

Identify source that uses the
lowest number port of the pair
of hosts and assume
that source is the server, 23e

FIG. 2A

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Applicant(s): Unknown at this time
CONNECTION BASED DENIAL OF SERVICE DETECTION

FIG. 3

FIG. 4

Aggregate statistics for host pairs, 46

41b

Host pair object, 45

Host ID, Host ID

Group Information, 47

Aggregate statistics and host identifiers of peers, 44

41a

Host object, 43

Host ID

FIG. 4A

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CONNECTION BASED DENIAL OF SERVICE DETECTION

Time Slice	Fri	Thu	Wed	...	Sun	Sat	Fri
Services provided by A (Web Server) to B (Desktop)							
WWW (TCP:80)							
Bytes / sec	2k	3k	1k	...	2k	4k	3k
Packets / sec	5	6	2		5	9	5
Conn's. / hr	.3	.5	.3		.2	.3	.3
SSH (TCP:22)							
Bytes / sec	1k	3k	4k	...	1k	2k	3k
Packets / sec	2	6	9		2	5	6
Conn's. / hr	.3	.5	.3		.3	.3	.5
Services provided by B (Desktop) to A (Web Server)							
SSH (TCP:22)							
Bytes / sec	21k	0	0	...	0	0	0
Packets / sec	10	0	0		0	0	0
Conn's. / hr	1	0	0		0	0	0

FIG. 5

FIG. 6

LUP, 49c

Long update, e.g., t < 24 hours.

SUP, 49b

Short update, e.g., t < 30mins.

TS, 49a

Time-slice, t < 2mins.

40

FIG. 7

Aggregator cluster member, 14n

Aggregator cluster member, 14a

FIG. 8

39 →

DOS, 60

Scan, 70

Worm, 80

Unauthorized
Access, 90

New hosts, 100

Failure, 110

50

Track moving average, 51

Track variance of parameter, 52

Find an anomaly?, 53

no

yes

Collect anomalies into events, 54

Send event reports, 55

FIG. 9

56

Traverse connection table, 56a

Identify and correlate anomalies
by examining connection
patterns, 56b

Determine event, 56c

Determine event severity, 56d

.Report event, 56e

FIG. 10

60

Analyze byte and packet
counts, 62

Attack, 63 ?

exit

yes

Iterate over connected
hosts to determine
possible attackers, 64

FIG. 11

83

High variance, 63b

yes   no

Use variance to
determine
if under attack, 63c

Compare measured
inbound
Rate to historical, 63b

Exceed?, 63d

Incoming
packet count above
threshold, 63e

No

yes

Increase severity of
reported event, 63f

FIG. 12

Report event, 63g

70

```
        ┌─────────────────────────────┐
        │ Host pair added to time-slice│◄──────┐
        │   connection table, 71      │        │
        └─────────────┬───────────────┘        │
                      │                          │
              ┌───────▼────────┐                 │
        ┌─────►   End of short  ─────┐           │
        │     │   Update, 72?        │           │
        │     └────────┬─────────────┘           │
       no              │ yes                      │
                       ▼                          │
        ┌─────────────────────────────┐          │
        │  Access time slice table, 73 │         │
        └─────────────┬───────────────┘          │
                      │                           │
              ┌───────▼────────┐    no            │
              │  Find new pair, 74? ────────────► │
              └────────┬────────┘                 │
                       │ yes                       │
                       ▼                           │
        ┌─────────────────────────────┐           │
        │     Add to host pairs, 75    │          │
        └─────────────┬───────────────┘           │
                      │                            │
              ┌───────▼────────┐   no              │
              │    Exceeds       ────────────────► │
              │ Threshold, C3?, 76│                │
              └────────┬─────────┘                 │
                       │ yes                        │
                       ▼                            │
              ┌────────────────┐    no              │
              │     Pairs        ──────────────────►│
              │ in profile less than│
              │   Factor C4, 77  │
              └────────┬─────────┘
                       │ yes
                       ▼
        ┌─────────────────────────────┐
        │     Flag as scanner, 78      │
        └─────────────────────────────┘
```

FIG. 13

80

```
        ┌────────────────────────────┐
        │  Access connection table, 82 │
        └────────────────────────────┘
                      │
                      ▼
        ┌────────────────────────────┐
        │  Examine host pairs in a scan, 83 │
        └────────────────────────────┘
                      │
                      ▼
        ┌────────────────────────────┐
        │     Reconstruct path used    │
        │        by worm, 84           │
        └────────────────────────────┘
                      │
                      ▼
        ┌────────────────────────────┐
        │     Examine ports used by    │
        │         worm, 85             │
        └────────────────────────────┘
                      │
                      ▼
        ┌────────────────────────────┐
        │ Determine exploited services, 86 │
        └────────────────────────────┘
```

FIG. 14

FIG. 15

90

```
        ┌─────────────────────────┐
        │  Examine host pairs from │
        │  connection table, 92    │
        └─────────────────────────┘
                     │
                     ▼
              ╱─────────────╲
   yes       ╱   Determine    ╲
◄────────── ⟨ if one host has  ⟩
            ╲ accessed another ╱
             ╲ host before, 94╱
              ╲─────────────╱
                     │ no
                     ▼
        ┌─────────────────────────┐
        │  Apply other indicia to  │
        │ determine if unauthorized│
        │       access, 96         │
        └─────────────────────────┘
                     │
                     ▼
        ┌─────────────────────────┐
        │   Apply indicia that can │
        │ decrease severity of event, 98│
        └─────────────────────────┘
                     │
                     ▼
        ┌─────────────────────────┐
        │      Send event, 99      │
        └─────────────────────────┘
```

FIG. 16

100

Receive statistics on a Host

no

Determine
if Host has received at least N
packets, 102

yes

no

Determine
if Host has transmitted at least N
packets, 102

yes

yes

Determine
if one Host has transmitted/
received at least N
packets before, 106

no

FIG. 17

Indicate Host as a new Host, 108

110

Receive statistics on a Host

no

Determine
if mean profiled rate of server
response packets from the Host "A" is
greater than M , 112

yes

no

Determine
if ratio of standard deviation rate to mean
rate of server response packets
is less than R, 114

yes

Indicate Host as a failed Host, 116

FIG. 18

12, collectors

12, collectors

Network, 18

10

Operator console
16

20, hosts

14

Aggregator,
14

200a

200b

200, grouping process

FIG. 19

FIG. 20

200

FIG. 21

Form groups of nodes according
to connection patterns, 200a

Merge groups into larger groups
according to connection habits,
200b

200a

construct a k-neighborhood
graph, 212

identify bi-connected
Components (BCC) in
the k-neighborhood graph, 214

assign nodes contained
in one BCC to a new group, 216

vertices representing those
hosts are removed, 220

replace vertices with one vertex
representing the entire group, 222

Repeat until the groups
are large enough, 224

FIG. 22

230

generate a connectivity
graph, 232

build *k*-neighborhood graph, 234 .

remove group nodes from
k- neighborhood graph, 236

Generate bi-connected
components, 238

replace in the connection graph
the nodes in *e* by a new group
node containing
those nodes, 240

label a group *G* by a pair
including a unique identifier, 242

no   do any ungrouped   yes
nodes remain in connection-graph
or does k=0, 244

200a

exit

FIG. 23

FIG. 24

Can more groups be merged?, 252   no

200b

yes

Determine group pairs
that meet connection and
similarity requirements, 254

exit

append a triple (*G1, G2, s*)
to a list *of* edges, 256

sort triples in list
of edges based on *s* – values, 258

Form a new group, *260*

assign to be the minimum
number of connection
pairs a host has, 262

clear the list of edges, 264

FIG. 25

270

```
┌─────────────────────────────┐
│  receive two sets of results │
│   produced by the grouping   │
│        process, 272          │
└─────────────────────────────┘
              │
              ▼
┌─────────────────────────────┐
│                             │
│   Correlate two results, 274 │
│                             │
└─────────────────────────────┘
```

FIG. 26

200b

```
┌─────────────────────────────────┐
│ compare results of two executions│
│    of grouping algorithm, 282    │
└─────────────────────────────────┘
                 │
                 ▼
┌─────────────────────────────────┐
│       Update the ID set, 284     │
└─────────────────────────────────┘
                 │
                 ▼
┌─────────────────────────────────┐
│         correlate the ID's       │
│        of the two sets, 286      │
└─────────────────────────────────┘
                 │
                 ▼
┌─────────────────────────────────┐
│     assigns ID according to the  │
│  highest degree of similarity,288│
└─────────────────────────────────┘
```

FIG. 27

200b

remove differences between
the two host sets, Ht and Ht-1
290

compare the connection
patterns of the hosts, 292

computes a set of
nodes at time t-1 but
removed at time t,
and a set of nodes that
only appear at time t, 294

determine similarity, 296

determine if groups
are the same, 298

FIG. 28

FIG. 29

FIG. 30

Provide list of events, 319a

User selects event, 319b

User snoozes event, 319c

FIG. 31

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CONNECTION BASED DENIAL OF SERVICE DETECTION

FIG. 32

FIG. 33

FIG. 34

FIG. 35

FIG. 36

FIG. 37

FIG. 38

410

FIG. 39

430

FIG. 40